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Introduction
It's no surprise that the world's youngest economy -the global economy -is still finding its bearings. The intricate checks and balances that stabilize economies are only incorporated with time. Many world markets are only recently freed, governed for the first time by the emotions of the people rather than the fists of the state. From where we sit, none of this diminishes the promise offered a decade ago by the demise of the walled off world. The spread of free markets and democracy around the world is permitting more people everywhere to turn their aspirations into achievements. And technology, properly harnessed and liberally distributed, has the power to erase not just geographical borders but also human ones. It seems to us that, for a 10-year-old, the world continues to hold great promise. In the meantime, no one ever said growing up was easy (13).
-Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree
The decades following the end of the Cold War have been marked by globalization, including an incredible amount of economic integration. The "walled off world," a characterization that conjures images of the Berlin Wall, has given way to a connected world.
States formerly separated by political and technological realities are now linked together with humming highways of trade. Hammer blows against the cement barriers that divided Berlin are still reverberating around the world in the form of roads, tunnels, bridges, airports, highways, and ports, working to crumble the remaining walls of the previous century. The process of globalization has manifested itself rapidly since the 1990s with the spread of free markets and the creation of institutions that allow for the transcendence of borders by goods, and sometimes even people. As the world's youngest economy, the global economy can be anthropomorphized as a young and impressionable person in the throes of a rapid growth spurt. Like many people during this time of their lives, the global economy does hold great promise but also experiences growing pains, clumsiness, naivety, and has even acquired a few bad habits and parasites along the way. In a world full of opportunity and blinding mobility, there are actors that would seek to exploit the natural clumsiness and naivety that characterize anything undergoing rapid growth.
The continued success of these actors demonstrates that the global economy and the states that benefit from it still have a lot of growing up to do.
Criminal organizations are amongst the most successful exploiters of the aforementioned characteristics of the global economy. They occupy the gaps and blind spots that have formed and grown since the 1990s, including the gap between rapid economic activity and limited state scrutiny. 'Ndrangheta, a criminal organization based in the Southern Italian region of Calabria stages its most lucrative operations in commercial hubs where the state has an economic incentive to limit its scrutiny of the products entering its borders, and as a result enormous amounts of commercial traffic occurs without a second glance. There is also the gap between economic and legal integration. Globalization has included extensive amounts of economic integration between states in the form of free trade agreements and the development of commercial infrastructure. Meanwhile states have done little to integrate their legal systems, and 'Ndrangheta successfully navigates the forest of conflicting, asymmetrical, and outdated legal codes to hide or protect itself. In order to rid the global economy of some of its growing pains and parasitic hangers-on, states must embrace their prerogative to match economic activity with appropriate levels of scrutiny and integration. Otherwise 'Ndrangheta and its counterparts will continue to grow more powerful, entrenched, wealthy, and inextricable from the global economy.
local population with the promise of up to 10,000 jobs (CIS 13). While the port and accompanying steel projects were built during the subsequent years, they were never made operational. The Port of Gioia Tauro became another one of Southern Italy's "cathedrals in the desert," that is, a public works project that never came to fruition or achieved the level of utility that had been promised. The port sat, unused, until the 1990s. In 1994 an entrepreneur named Angelo Ravano proposed a complete remodel of the existing infrastructure into a commercial port (CIS 14) . If the Port of Gioia Tauro was born in the context of violence and desperation during the 1970s, it would be reborn during the rapid globalization and optimism of the 1990s.
In 2012 the Centre for Industrial Studies in Milan created a detailed assessment of the transformation of the Port of Gioia Tauro and its subsequent growth for the European Commission, which had partnered with Angelo Ravano to finance the project during the 1990s.
The European Commission, which serves as the executive body of the European Union, financed about 14% of the project's cost through the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund (CIS 3). While the port was originally constructed as an entirely public project, its transformation into a commercial port was overwhelmingly a private enterprise.
According to the CIS assessment, private investment covered 85% of the project's cost, making the project an economic symbol of the period of privatization, deregulation, and economic integration that characterized the post-Cold War order. Most strikingly, less than 1% of the port's cost was covered by national, regional, and local contributions, a significant departure from the public financing model for the building of infrastructure that had served as the norm in Italy and throughout Europe during the post-Second World War period. (CIS 3)
The CIS assessment describes the project as "an emblematic story of great business success and unexploited potential for local development" (2). This declaration at the beginning of the assessment carefully defines the project as a "business success." Operationally, the port continues to serve as the standard bearer for the transshipment model and provides a crucial trade link between the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal that can host the largest container ships.
The effects of globalization lowered the costs of commercial transport with the rise of large container carrying vessels, meanwhile the demand for deep ports that could host these ships rose amid a boom in freight transportation between the Mediterranean Sea and Far East. The Gioia Tauro Port Authority also notes the port is "located in the heart of the Mediterranean, a meeting point between the East-West sea lanes and the trans-European corridor" and occupies "a central position with respect to the corridors of the intercontinental routes that run through the Mediterranean basin" ("Mission & Values"). The port's design, location, and constructing timing allowed it to become "the premier transshipment hub in the Mediterranean" ("Mission & Values"). The CIS assessment defines transshipment as "a scheme of transport, consisting of disembarking cargo from a large ship (or mother vessel) in an intermediate destination port and then embarking it onto smaller ships (feeder vessels) for onward transport to its final destination" (19). The assessment adds that transshipment ports were in demand because "transshipment activity boomed during the 1990s as a result of the increase in international trade following globalization dynamics, freight containerization and the need to cut global freight transport costs" (10). For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that "in most cases, the goods in the containers are not cleared through customs in the transshipment hub, but rather in their destination ports" meaning the millions of containers that temporarily sit in the Port of Gioia Tauro every year are usually not required to clear customs inspections (CIS 10).
In terms of return on investment, the port is not exactly a testament to the efficacy of the business model employed by the European Union and private investors. The CIS assessment 7 found that "up to now the project has proven to be not financially sustainable, as its cumulated net cash flows have not been positive each year since the start of the operational phase (1995)" (4). The assessment attributes this failure to its "socio-economic context and dependency on highly volatile global demand" (4). Essentially the solvency of the port depends on a consistently high level of traffic, and economic fluctuations stemming from events like the global recession in 2008 prevented this consistency. Additionally, the port did not bring the widespread development to the region that was originally expected during its transformation and its local benefits were instead limited to increasing employment. According to the assessment, Calabria was the least developed region in Italy when the port was transformed in the 1990s and retains this title today. The Province of Reggio Calabria has not experienced a significant economic boost since 1995, despite containing Italy's most active port. The following chart illustrates Reggio Calabria's per capita GDP relative to that of the region of Calabria and Southern Italy at large, between 1995 and 2008. Note the pronounced fluctuations in GDP plus the magnified effect of the 2008 recession on Reggio Calabria as the volatility of the port's traffic levels jerked around the local economy.
(CIS 8)
Much of the local frustration surrounding the port stems from this inability to pass its operational success onto the local population, coupled with the surge in criminal activity relating to port's traffic (CIS 9). Ultimately the GDP of Reggio Calabria was lower in 2008 than it had been before the construction of the port, after a ten-year decline. The port's "business success," having had little benefit to the local population, continues to enrich the region's 'Ndrangheta clans beyond their wildest expectations. The ability of 'Ndrangheta to exploit the port depends on its design, policies, and location. It is important to detail the scale of the port's operations and the precautions taken by the state to demonstrate how the Port of Gioia Tauro and similar commercial hubs continue to challenge states' abilities to scrutinize the expanding rivers of goods flowing through their borders. As diplomacy and technology continue to provide an impetus for states to integrate their economies and increase the amount of commerce flowing through their points of exit and entry, it is crucial that they take appropriate measures to ensure criminal actors do not exploit flows of licit goods for the purpose of moving their illicit goods.
The Port of Gioia Tauro maintains its title as the largest port in Italy in terms of container throughput, that is, the number of containers handled per year. With the rise of container-based trade and transshipment ports, throughput has become the standard measure for the productivity of a seaport. According to the CIS assessment, Gioia Tauro's operational success can be attributed in part to its natural depth, 18 meters at its deepest (20) . The port offers a long, deep section of water 3.4 kilometers long that can service up to four "ultra large container carriers," more than any other European port. The port is also equipped with 22 ship-to-shore cranes that can service 23 rows of containers. Its throughput peaked on the eve of the global financial crisis in 2008, reaching 3,467,772 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) that year (CIS 20) . This peak traffic level implies the processing of about 9500 containers per day. One TEU typically represents one shipping container and the measurement is used to quantify the carrying capacity of a vessel or the throughput of a port.
For comparison, the Port of Naples, to which the very first chapter of Roberto Saviano's Gomorra is dedicated, processes up to 500,000 TEUs annually. This number is a mere 14% of Gioia Tauro's capacity (Harbours Review) 1 . The same conditions, economic forces, and consequences vividly described by Saviano in his first chapter titled "The Port" are still at play in Gioia Tauro, but on an even larger scale. The exasperation of Naples' Port Authority and local law enforcement is magnified for their Calabrian counterparts.
The following table provided by the CIS assessment illustrates the emergence of commercial container shipping, in terms of world container throughput. The Port of Gioia Tauro 10 emerged at the ideal moment during the 1990s when container-based shipping exploded and became a dominant means for the movement of goods in a rapidly integrating global economy.
(CIS 18)
A port, of course, is not just a set of docks. The Port of Gioia Tauro has a total area of 4,400,000 square meters, or 822 football fields (CIS 10). The land components of the port, about 75% of its total area, include expansive zones for container handling and storage and a privately owned terminal (CIS 10). A vacant industrial area adjoins the port property and adds another 3.6 million square meters to the grounds. The Port Authority of Gioia Tauro and its affiliate security wing are responsible for preventing illegal activity throughout this entire area. The following image of the Port of Gioia Tauro demonstrates the scope of this jurisdiction.
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The square strips of color above the channel (highlighted in red) are container loading and temporary storage areas, officially called the Medcenter Container Terminal. Above the large container terminal are vacant industrial areas. The administrative center containing the offices of the Harbormaster, Port Authority, and Port Security are located in Zone 1.
The Port Authority of Gioia Tauro administers the port and oversees an entity titled Gioia Tauro Port Security, the port's security apparatus. Despite the frequent use of the port for illicit activity by 'Ndrangheta clans, the Gioia Tauro Port Security (GTPS) maintains that its sole objective is to "guarantee a high safety standard for economic operators; therefore, the port security legislation called International Ship and Port Facility Security Code has been implemented, which contains provisions aimed at preventing terrorist attacks to the detriment of the ship or port infrastructure" ("Security Portuale"). It is reasonable to expect the port's security system to take protective measures against possible terrorism, but the exclusion of anti-mafia language in its mission statement is a telling preview of its demonstrated inability to confront the actual illicit activity at the port. The Port of Gioia Tauro is unlikely to experience any form of terrorist attack that would jeopardize the safety of "economic operators," but the port's recent history does indicate a high degree of vulnerability to less overt but far more lucrative forms of crime.
The tunnel vision focus on terrorism on the part of GTPS might not stem from simply willful ignorance of other more imminent threats. Gioia Tauro Port Security does not have many inspective obligations because, as noted previously, the Port of Gioia Tauro is a transshipment port and most containers are only temporarily unloaded before being redistributed onto smaller vessels. These containers are not required to clear customs because their contents will not officially enter the country until they are unloaded at their next destination. With regard to the freight temporarily housed in the port, the responsibilities of GTPS are restricted to "control of documentation for the purpose of access to authorized port; monitoring of common areas and port facilities through surveys; carrying out periodic patrols in the port area for the monitoring of the plants; specific security operations" ("Security Portuale"). The contents of the port's freight are not within the jurisdiction of GTPS and it can only attempt to prevent its illegal loading or unloading. GTPS also has limitations in terms of manpower, technology, and intelligence resources. While the Port Authority of Gioia Tauro is a government entity, GTPS is a private subsidiary of the Port Authority and not part of a larger law enforcement or military body.
Further information on GTPS is difficult to come by, -all but its website home page are listed as "under construction"-. The largest port in Italy in terms of container traffic, processing over 9500 container units per day, effectively outsources its security to a small private security company that cannot maintain a functional website, and about 25 police officers (Mucci) .
The Port of Gioia Tauro's performance as a transshipment port has varied since it became operational in 1995. Port traffic rapidly increased during its first five years of operations and by 2000 the port hosted 35% of Mediterranean commercial traffic, easily the largest market share in the region (CIS 23). Despite this rapid increase in traffic, the Italian government did little to update the port, eroding the quality of the port's service and contributing to its gradual loss of competitiveness with its North African and Spanish counterparts. While efficiency and productivity suffered without continued updates, an ominous gap also appeared between the port's security capacity and a high level of traffic that still outpaced its European counterparts.
The scope and capabilities of GTPS have remained static since the security apparatus was established. It is not surprising that this gap between high levels of port traffic and overstretched or insufficient law enforcement continues to be exploited by criminal actors, and not only in the Port of Gioia Tauro. An anonymous manager of the Medcenter Terminal, in a 2015 interview with Al Jazeera, effectively articulated the frustrating relationship between traffic and scrutiny at the port: "How can we check everything? If we checked every cargo, no ship would stop and the port would die" (Mucci) .
It is also unlikely that Italian imports will relent in the future, particularly the types of imports most likely to be exploited by 'Ndrangheta. The European Union is currently negotiating trade agreements with Canada and several South American states to further expand commercial links between Europe and these regions, including two that already host significant levels of 'Ndrangheta activity: Argentina and Canada (CEU Trade Policy).
In the opening chapter of Gomorra, Roberto Saviano describes a parallel situation to that of Gioia Tauro at the Port of Naples, located just north of Calabria in the Italian region of Campania. Saviano creates a vivid and ominous rendering of the daily chaos that takes place at
Italian ports, as well as the benefits afforded to organized crime by this chaos. He writes that the Port of Naples is "an open wound. The end point for the interminable voyage that merchandise makes. Ships enter the gulf and come to the dock like babies to the breast, except that they're here to be milked, not fed" (4). He continues:
In the silence of the port's black hole, the molecular structure of merchandise seems to break down, only to recompose once it gets beyond the perimeter of the coast. Goods have to leave the port immediately. Everything happens so quickly that they disappear in the process, evaporate as if they'd never existed. As if nothing had happened, as if it had all been simply an act. An imaginary voyage, a false landing, a phantom ship, evanescent cargo. Goods need to arrive in the buyer's hands without leaving any drool to mark their route, they have to reach their warehouse quickly, right away, before time can even begin-time that might allow for an inspection. Tons of merchandise move as if they were a package hand-delivered by the mailman. In the port of Naples-330 acres spread out along seven miles of coastline-time expands and contracts. Things that take an hour elsewhere seem to happen here in less than a minute. Here the proverbial slowness that makes the Neapolitan's every move molasses-like is quashed, confuted, negated (5).
At multiple points Saviano highlights the speed at which products must move through the Port of Naples. These products move "before time can even begin-time that might allow for an inspection" (Saviano 5) . The massive quantity of products moving through ports like Gioia
Tauro and Naples demands quick processing, with little room for the inefficient delays that meticulous inspection would imply. These ports are an open wound for Italy in the sense that a wound places the body at risk to parasites that would like to exploit the new and vulnerable opening in the skin. The capacity for products to "disappear in the process" or "arrive in the buyer's hands without leaving any drool to mark their route" is an undeniably attractive characteristic for those parasitic organizations seeking to insert their illicit products into the general influx. The actual Italian word for "drool" used by Saviano in this passage is bava, which invokes the trail of slime left by snails. The subtle snail metaphor is perfect in the sense that it captures the general nature of the commercial shipping boom of the 1990s and onward. In fact,
both Italian exports and imports increased by about 110% between 1995 and 2016, providing a massive stream of commerce upon which organizations like 'Ndrangheta could piggyback their illicit shipments (World Bank).
The movement of products during the previous decades could be seen as snail-like when compared to the accelerated 21 st century model. During the 1990s, relatively slow and traceable movement quickly gave way to something much faster and far more difficult to scrutinize.
Saviano reinforces this point with another parallel animal metaphor: "A port is measured by its speed, and every bureaucratic sluggishness, every meticulous inspection, transforms the cheetah of transport into a slow and lumbering sloth" (6). The economic incentives to move products more quickly through the port do in fact take precedence over security. Saviano cites statistics provided by the Italian Customs Agency, which found that "60 percent of the goods arriving in Naples escape official customs inspection" (7). Being that Naples is not a transshipment port, this number is particularly shocking. As previously explained, Gioia Tauro is uniquely vulnerable when it comes to Italian ports because it is not a final destination goods passing through it are rarely subject to inspection. At the Port of Naples, where most containers are actually unloaded, there is a justifiably larger customs presence. While this heightened customs presence still yields a 60% escape rate in Naples, Gioia Tauro's higher level of traffic and lower customs presence due to its transshipment designation explain why this port in particular has become the primary entry point for drugs entering Italy.
According to Saviano, products have "multiple, hybrid, and illegitimate citizenship. Halfborn in the middle of China, they're finished on the outskirts of some Slavic city, refined in northeastern Italy, packaged in Puglia or north of Tirana in Albania, and finally end up in a warehouse somewhere in Europe. No human being could ever have the rights of mobility that merchandise has" (6). When one understands the true permeability of world borders to goods by way of truck or ship, the true vulnerability of ports like Gioia Tauro and Naples becomes much clearer. However, 'Ndrangheta also exploits the institutions that provide for the free movement of people, in addition to those that prohibit it. The high demand for passage into Europe from the Middle East due to regional conflict and asylum opportunities in Germany have induced some 'Ndrangheta clans to engage in human trafficking. Meanwhile institutions such as the Schengen Area in the EU and further visa agreements for Italian citizens allow clan members to travel between Calabria and foreign bases of operation around the world without a visa and sometimes without the need to clear customs. While 'Ndrangheta exploits policies that provide for the free movement of both individuals and products, the mixed origins of products and their extraordinary freedom of movement through the ports of the world gives them a particularly potent form of anonymity.
The more creative and often horrific methods of drug trafficking have an outsized weight when it comes to the general public's perception of the dominant drug trafficking methods.
Many have heard the stories involving catapults sending bricks of cocaine over the U.S.-Mexico border or perhaps drug runners using tunnels underneath it, or even the morbid emergence of the "heroin mule," that is, a Latin American woman trained to swallow and later expel balloons of heroin in order to move the product into the United States via airport. The public has also been exposed to images of the remarkable "cigarette boats" and aircraft used by the Colombian drug cartels to spirit cocaine through the Caribbean into Florida. Further misconceptions about drug trafficking may also be perpetuated to serve some form of political goal, such as the reduction of immigration flows. A frequent and demonstrably erroneous argument for the creation of stronger borders between states is that undocumented immigrants will carry drugs with them over unfortified borders. But the reality of global drug trafficking is far more complex and cannot be remedied with border fortification or frisking individuals at airports. The vast majority of drug traffic that enters Europe and the United States from South America does so through the same means and entry points as licit commercial traffic. Licit goods do not typically penetrate borders by way of tunnel, catapult, or attached to the human body, and neither do drugs.
In its glowing report on the Port of Gioia Tauro's performance, the CIS assessment grudgingly acknowledges "The Role of Organized Crime" in a small aside halfway through the document (28). This acknowledgment, while brief, does preview the parasitic relationship between the port and 'Ndrangheta, particularly when it comes to interactions between the owners of the Medcenter Terminal (MCT) and the local Piromalli-Molè clan. This relationship began as one that very much resembled the traditional protection rackets employed by organized crime in
Italy. As the Italian government attempted to rebuild Italy's infrastructure and economy in the decades after World War Two, Italian organized crime jumped at the chance to make a profit.
John Dickey explains the rise of the "cement mafia" in his book, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia:
The sack of Palermo began on the ground, with the mafiosi who now kept watch over the building sites just as they had once kept watch over the lemon groves. Vandalism and theft could bring any construction project to a halt if the local boss chose. The second story of mafia influence was a dense tier of small subcontractors who supplied workers and materials… On the level above them were the great building entrepreneurs, men tied into corrupt webs of friends, relatives, clients, and cohorts. Those networks become thicker and thicker the more one probes, connecting local politicians, municipal functionaries, lawyers, policemen, building contractors, bankers, businessmen, and mafiosi (225).
This phenomenon is notorious for having corrupted public works projects in Sicily, but it also occurred in Calabria. The local clan would offer construction companies assistance in procuring lucrative government building contracts. The same clan usually controlled a pocket of votes that it could offer, along with bribes, to politicians in exchange for these contracts. The clan would then extract a share of the government contract for its services rendered, and finally turn around and demand that the construction company pay a protection fee to the clan so that it could provide men to watch over the construction sites, or it would subject them to vandalism. Ravano, but the format of the arrangement certainly mirrors the standard practice of organized crime in Italy leading up to 1995. Regardless, the CIS assessment characterizes this incident as "parallel with the construction of Gioia Tauro," in that it was limited to the port's actual construction and was merely a preview of the 'Ndrangheta activity that followed (28).
The assessment then admits, "it is likely that organized crime enjoyed a bonanza as a result of the port operations" and cites the 2008 Commission report, which concluded, "the 'ndrangheta uses the facility as a base for illegal trafficking" (28). In this way, the exploitation of Bank" appeared in newspapers around the world while many had never even heard of the organization before (Mucci) .
The capacity for organized crime to transform and adapt to exploit new economic opportunities is also discussed in Gomorra. The Neapolitan counterpart of 'Ndrangheta, the Camorra, demonstrates many of the same tendencies. Saviano writes:
Investigations conducted by the Naples anti-Mafia prosecutor reveal that the Camorra's flexible, federalist structure has completely transformed the fabric of the families: instead of diplomatic alliances and stable pacts, clans now operate more like business committees. The Camorra's flexibility reflects its need to move capital, set up and liquidate companies, circulate money, and invest quickly in real estate without geographical restrictions or heavy dependence on political mediation (45).
John Dickey makes a similar point about the adaptability of the mafia in Cosa Nostra:
Over the past century and a half the mafia has responded to all of the great challenges of modernity: to capitalism, to the emergence of the nation-state, to democracy, to the rise and fall of the great ideologies of Socialism and Fascism, to global war, to industrialization and deindustrialization. Nothing that the nineteenth or twentieth centuries could throw at the Sicilian mafia managed to stop it (329). the subjects of any legal action and maintained that they were solely victims of 'Ndrangheta who cooperated completely with law enforcement throughout the entire process. Meanwhile, the leadership of the clan was decimated. Girolamo, Peppe, and Gioacchino Piromalli were quickly convicted and incarcerated, while Rocco Molè was killed near Gioia Tauro that same year. This legal action compelled the 'Ndrangheta clans that depended on the Port of Gioia Tauro,
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including the Piromalli-Molè clan, to complete the transition from protection rackets and construction contracts to a more absolute dependence on drug trafficking (Gratteri 153 ).
It is difficult to determine the amount of drugs that enter Europe through Gioia Tauro, in addition to its share of the overall drug imports for the continent and criminal profits from these operations. Measuring these phenomenon runs into the classic problem of trying to quantify clandestine market exchanges. However, weighing evidence such as increases in overall quantities seized in Gioia Tauro and extensive 'Ndrangheta ties to South American cocaine production, Italian authorities are able to make some estimates. There is also a general rule used by law enforcement when quantifying the total amount of drug traffic. Italian law enforcement maintains that there are about nine kilograms of undetected cocaine moving through Gioia Tauro for every kilogram seized (Mucci) .
The CIS assessment found that, "most of the cocaine coming from Colombia reaches Cocaine Seized (kg)
about 31% of the total amount of cocaine seized in Italy during this period was seized at the Port of Gioia Tauro itself, while much of the remainder is believed to have come by way of the port.
Given the "nine for every one" rule for drug confiscations, the DIA estimates that a total of 50 metric tons moved through the port between 2011 and 2014 (Mucci) . In an interview with Al Jazeera, an Italian magistrate specializing in organized crime named Roberto Di Palma remarked, "when it comes to drug trafficking, it is always hard to have reliable numbers. What we can say with certainty is that in terms of numbers of drug requisitions by port authorities, Gioia Tauro tops Europe" (Mucci) . It is important to understand why these numbers still cause law enforcement officials in Italy and the European Union to estimate that as much 80% or more of the total amount of cocaine consumed in the EU arrives by way of Gioia Tauro, even though it would seem that its share of the total is much smaller. The answer can be found in the quality of the cocaine that arrives in Gioia Tauro, which is about 90% pure on average, a testament to the lucrative relationship between 'Ndrangheta and its South American partners. This relationship allows the clans to import very pure cocaine directly from its producers and dominate the European market.
According to Vincenzo Caruso, an official in the Guardia di Finanza (a law enforcement agency specializing in financial crime), "the cocaine arriving in Gioia Tauro is usually about 90 28 percent pure, meaning that it can be cut up to four times before being placed on the market" (Mucci) . The process of "cutting" cocaine involves mixing filler material into the initial quantity to expand its mass, and therefore the amount that can eventually be sold. In this way, the original 50 metric tons of 90% pure cocaine can quickly double, triple, and quadruple in mass as it is divided and cut by different dealers before final consumption. The estimated 50 metric tons that passed through Gioia Tauro between 2011 and 2014 was amplified until it reached a figure closer to 250-300 metric tons, and a purity of 20-30%. The following graphic helps illustrate this process.
The capacity of highly pure cocaine to expand once it enters the European drug market confirms 'Ndrangheta supremacy as a drug trafficking organization. Since the transformation of the Port of Gioia Tauro in 1995 and the overall surge in commercial shipping activity in the 1990s, the organization has successfully positioned itself as the primary importer of cocaine on the continent, using Gioia Tauro as its landing point. To make the quantum leap from protection rackets, kidnappings, and construction projects to controlling 80% of the European cocaine Agreement to commit a serious crime (conspiracy).
According to the law, "when three or more persons associate in order to commit several criminal offences, those promoting or setting up or organizing such association shall be liable, for this sole offence, to imprisonment for 3 to 7 years. For the sole fact of participating in the association, the punishment shall be imprisonment for 1 to 5 years. Those directing the association shall be liable to the same punishments as those promoting it" (UNODC). Vallelonga's laundromat conversation to secure a declaration stating that a particular association is a criminal association, which then gives the state more scrutiny power in the form of infiltration or surveillance, in order to obtain evidence of actual crimes committed by members.
Vallelonga was accused under
Whereas in Italy, Tony Vallelonga's laundromat conversation is sufficient proof of participation in the activities of 'Ndrangheta, an organization specifically identified as being a criminal association, earning him a guaranteed prison sentence.
In a paper titled "Countering the Australian 'Ndrangheta," Anna Sergi explains:
Within the more general approach against organized crime as seen across Australian jurisdictions, the only way to actually criminalize mafias would be by adding the 'ndrangheta to the list of proscribed criminal associations. This, however, is bound to be a very unpopular choice: first, because it would carry the risk of criminalizing ethnic connotations (the Calabrian element of the 'ndrangheta) and second, as said, because we do not actually know how formal is the organizational structure of the Calabrian clans in Australia. The risk would be, once again, to target (ethnic) identities and not (mafia) behaviors, which the 'ndrangheta exhibits also in Australia (329). Rome, Roberti identified "irregular legal symmetry between different countries," "scarce international cooperation," and "differences between judicial systems" as significant barriers to the prosecution of transnational organized crime (Roberti) . His emphasis on the concept of legal symmetry serves as a warning to the international community. Since the 1990s, states have demonstrated an aggressive capacity to pursue economic integration, but ignore the implications of this integration on the expansion of organized crime. Economic integration and the surging commerce that comes with it must be complimented with legal integration, which allows parallel legislation to span borders with the same ease demonstrated by criminal organizations. As the international community grapples with the global economy, the world's youngest economy, inconsistencies are bound to arise until they are ironed out. However, the gap between economic and legal integration is one of the most glaring inconsistencies due to the extent to which it has empowered criminal organizations like 'Ndrangheta.
No one ever said growing up was easy, but the global economy is arguably over 25 years old. 25 years have passed since the world was first confronted with the challenges of rapid globalization. States must recognize that the commerce that benefits them also presents opportunities to parasitic actors outside the licit economy. Only when the international community begins the aggressive pursuit of anti-mafia legislation criminalizing mafia association outside of Italy, combined with commitments to provide the technology, manpower,
